AUSTIN NICHOLS, The Urban Institute
LUCIE SCHMIDT, Williams College - Department of Economics
PURVI SEVAK, Hunter College, Department of Economics
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides federally-funded income support for individuals with disabilities, and has become one of the most important means-tested transfer programs in the United States. Previous studies have examined the effects of economic conditions on growth in disability caseloads, but most focus on the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. Most work on SSI dates from before welfare reform, which had both direct and indirect effects on the composition of the population at risk for SSI participation. In this paper we examine the relationship between SSI application risk and economic conditions between 1996 and 2010, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) linked to the Social Security Administration’s 831 file, which includes monthly data on SSI (and SSDI) application and receipt. Results from hazard models suggest that higher state unemployment rates have a large, positive effect on the risk of SSI application among jobless individuals, and our evidence suggests that female potential applicants may be more responsive to local economic conditions than men. State-level TANF policies have no effect on SSI application risk but state fiscal distress significantly increases application risk. Given the continued growth of the SSI program, understanding these relationships is increasingly important and policy-relevant.
KATHLEEN M. MCGARRY, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
ROBERT F. SCHOENI, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center
The Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) provides a guaranteed income for the elderly. As such it can serve to mitigate any deleterious effects of reductions in Social Security benefits that might result from any Social Security reform. However, participation in SSI among qualified individuals has proven to be low. We show that this low participation rate, just over 50%, observed at the program’s inception has continued to today with little if any change. We also find that transfers from children are far larger among eligible non-participants suggesting that family assistance may offset the need for public assistance.