Thursday, February 11, 2016

Job opportunities at AARP

PPI Website Banner

Looking to Help Solve Today's Key Policy Challenges?
Join the AARP Public Policy Institute

Economics / Finance/ Public Policy
The AARP Public Policy Institute is looking to fill a number senior policy advisor positions in its financial security group.  We are looking for individuals with expertise in one or more of the following issue areas: (1) Social Security, (2) Employment, (3) Retirement Savings and Financial Planning, and (4) Consumer Finance Issues, including insurance and financial products.

Duties:

  • Identify policy challenges and solutions, including emerging trends, in areas of expertise
  • Develop policy options and strategies to enable AARP to promote changes to improve the lives of Americans age 50-plus and their families
  • Use appropriate research methodologies and data to conduct and oversee original policy research on highly-visible and potentially controversial issues
  • Write research reports, fact sheets, policy briefs, and blogs for public release
  • Work collaboratively with internal stakeholders to help AARP achieve its strategic objectives
  • Advise internal stakeholders in areas of expertise, including evaluating Federal and state regulatory and legislative proposals

Qualifications:

  • Advanced degree in Economics, Public Policy, other Social Sciences, or related discipline; Ph.D. preferred
  • 5+ years of relevant professional experience in research and data analysis, and public policy evaluation and development
  • Excellent written and oral communication skills and exceptional skills in presenting complex issues to a wide range of audiences
  • Experience analyzing data using statistical software such as SAS, SPSS or STATA preferred

Apply at:

Senior Policy Advisor - Savings and Planning - (12458027)

Senior Policy Advisor- Labor Market - (12457901)

Senior Policy Advisor -Social Security - (12457843)

Senior Policy Advisor-Consumer Finance - (12458370)

AARP is an equal opportunity employer committed to hiring a diverse workforce and sustaining an inclusive culture.  AARP does not discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, color, national origin, age, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, mental or physical disability, genetic information, veteran status, or on any other basis prohibited by applicable law.

Facebook

Twitter

PPI Image for Website

 

Contact Us

PPI Website

Forward to a Friend

 

Update your e-mail profile at PPI, click here.
If you would like to stop receiving AARP's Economic Security Update Newsletter, then please click here.

If you would prefer to stop receiving all email from AARP, unsubscribe from all AARP e-mails.
Privacy Statement
We are committed to protecting your privacy. See our privacy policy for additional information.
About AARP
AARP is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization that helps people 50+ have independence, choice and control in ways that are beneficial and affordable to them and society as a whole. AARP Member Benefits are offered by third-parties through contractual arrangements with AARP, and AARP Services Incorporated or AARP Financial Incorporated, both wholly-owned subsidiaries of AARP.
AARP ©1995-2016. All rights reserved.
AARP 601 E Street NW Washington, DC 20049

Read more!

Tuesday, February 9, 2016

New papers from the Social Science Research Network

"How Does Retirement Impact Health Behaviors? An International Comparison"
CESR-Schaeffer Working Paper No. 2015-033

NORMA B. COE, University of Washington - Department of Health Services, Boston College - Center for Retirement Research
Email: nbcoe@uw.edu
GEMA ZAMARRO, University of Arkansas - Department of Education Reform, Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR)
Email: gzamarro@uark.edu

Recent work has found that retirement may lead to improvements in health, although the literature has not yet reached a consensus. This could be due to actual differences in the relationship of interest between countries or due to methodological differences between studies. The first goal of this paper is to estimate the causal impact of retirement on self-reported health using consistent estimation techniques on three harmonized longitudinal data sets, representative of the United States, England, and continental Europe. Using panel data and instrumental variable methods exploiting variation in statutory retirement ages, this paper then estimates how retirement causally affects health and health-related behaviors. We find, in all settings, retirement leads to better self-reported health, but that magnitude of the effect varies considerably. We also find that retirement increases the amount of exercise for those retiring from nonphysical jobs in all settings. The effect of retirement on addictive behaviors (drinking and smoking) was more mixed across settings. These findings suggest that public health interventions targeted to get near retirees to exercise more could allow countries to reap the benefits of a longer-working life while minimizing the associated health decline.

"Families and Social Security"
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5655

HANS FEHR, University of W├╝rzburg - Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
Email: hans.fehr@mail.uni-wuerzburg.de
MANUEL KALLWEIT, German Council of Economic Experts
Email: manuel.kallweit@uni-wuerzburg.de
FABIAN KINDERMANN, University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics, Netspar
Email: fabian.kindermann@uni-bonn.de

The present paper quantifies the importance of family insurance for the analysis of social security. We therefore augment the standard overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic labor productivity and longevity risk in that we account for gender and marital status. We simulate the abolition of pay-as-you-go pension payments, calculate the resulting intergenerational welfare changes and isolates aggregate efficiency effects for singles and families by means of compensating transfers. In accordance with previous studies that take into account transitional dynamics, we find that abolishing social security creates significant efficiency losses. Most importantly, however, we show that singles are substantially worse off from a shut-down of old-age payments compared to married couples. A decomposition of the efficiency loss reveals that this difference can be almost exclusively attributed to the insurance role of the family with respect to longevity risk. Since a married individual inherits her spouse’s wealth after his death and the likelihood that both partners reach a very old age is relatively small, marriage serves as an insurance device against longevity risk for the surviving partner.

"Retirement Planning in the Light of Changing Demographics"

HONG WANG, Monash Business School
Email: hong.s.wang@monash.edu
BONSOO KOO, Monash Business School
Email: bonsoo.koo@gmail.com
COLIN O'HARE, Monash University - Department of Econometrics & Business Statistics
Email: colin.ohare@monash.edu

With increasing longevity and decreasing fertility rates, governments and policy makers are increasingly engaged in the question of long term retirement planning. In many cases this has included emphasising the need for individuals to take more responsibility for their own retirement planning through tax incentives, compulsion and changes to the age at which state retirement benefits become available. In the case of Australia, as is considered here, long term retirement planning has been focused around the development of a compulsory defined contribution (DC) superannuation system. Here we investigate the interaction between population aging and the sustainability of the superannuation system by modelling a general superannuation scheme to compare the adequacy of retirement funds under a number of alternative scenarios. The model incorporates stochastic longevity forecasts and provides insight into the sufficiency of compulsory retirement saving both now and future. We find that the current pension scheme is more robust to longevity improvements for mid-class individuals however significant gaps arise for low-income individuals as longevity improves. Without addressing these issues, government expenditure is expected to increase substantially.

Read more!

Thursday, January 21, 2016

Are the CBO's Social Security projections unreasonable?

Alicia Munnell of the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College has a Marketplace column that's critical of the Congressional Budget Office's projections for Social Security's financing, so much so that she places the CBO estimates outside of the "reasonable" range that policymakers should focus on. Is she right?

Social Security's Trustees project that the program faces a 75-year actuarial deficit of 2.68% of taxable payroll. For simplicity, that implies that a 2.68 percentage point increase in the Social Security payroll tax -- from the current 12.4% to 15.08% -- would be sufficient to keep the program's trust funds solvent through 75 years. The CBO projects a 75-year shortfall of 4.37% of payroll, which obviously is substantially larger than the Trustees' forecast.

Munnell points to her recent experience heading the Social Security Advisory Board's Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods. The Tech Panel makes its own recommendations with regard to the main demographic and economic assumptions that drive Social Security financing. Based on the Tech Panel's recommendations, SSA's actuaries scores a 75-year shortfall of of 3.42% of payroll. So Munnell isn't saying that the Trustees projected deficit might not be too low, but rather that the CBO forecast is simply too high to be considered reasonable.

Part of this difference of opinion might come about from a misunderstanding: Munnell points to three areas in which the CBO makes different assumptions than the Trustees: first, CBO assumes greater longevity increases than the Trustees, something which Tech Panels have been recommending for as long as I can remember; second, CBO assumes lower interest rates, which reduce interest earned on the Social Security trust funds. This also is a common area of disagreement, given that current interest rates are so low. Third, CBO assumes that disability benefit claims will continue at higher rates than do the Trustees. I have some sympathy with this argument, given -- as Corner University economist Richard Burkhauser has noted -- the Trustees/actuaries have in the past assumed that relief from rising disability claims was around the corner, but disability continued to increase. While it's not clear by how much CBO's assumptions differ from the Trustees, no one familiar with the process and debates would argue that reasonable people can't disagree on these issues. Having been involved with the Trustees Reports during my time at SSA, there were often people in those meetings who disagreed with where the Trustees ultimately ended up, in ways that would increase or decrease the funding shortfalls.

But Munnell appears to miss another difference of opinion between the CBO and the Social Security Trustees: CBO assumes that earnings inequality will continue to rise, whereas the Trustees assume that after 10 years there won't be any additional changes. Increasing earnings inequality reduces the share of wages covered by Social Security taxes, as well as reducing benefits paid on those wages, but the net effect is to worsen Social Security's long-term deficit. Again, this is an issue on which reasonable people can disagree: my gut is that if health cost increases continue to remain slow, we may see a reduction in earnings inequality. (See this WSJ piece for why.) On the other hard, the Trustees tend to flat-line trends after 10 years due to how SSA's actuarial models are built, which shouldn't be the deciding factor in what's reasonable or not.

It would be nice to see greater detail on CBO's projections, from which we might be able to figure out more precisely what is driving the differences between CBO and the Social Security Trustees. But for now, I don't see any evidence that CBO's projections are unreasonable. The CBO has the more sophisticated model for projecting Social Security's finances and my own view is that the CBO group is more willing to embrace new evidence or thinking as it comes up. That said, as Munnell points out, only time will tell which long-term assumptions turn out to be correct.

If the CBO is right, though, we face a large problem that our political processes are very ill-equipped to address prior to a crisis coming about. That's worrying. Read more!

Tuesday, January 12, 2016

Upcoming event: “How America supports retirement: Correcting myths about taxes and Social Security.”

Wednesday, January 20, 2016 | 12:30 pm - 2:00 pm

How America supports retirement: Correcting myths about taxes and Social Security

Book Forum

AEI, Twelfth Floor
1150 Seventeenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036


Government policy supports retirement preparedness primarily through two mechanisms: Social Security, a mandatory contributory pension for all workers, and tax deferral, which provides incentives for voluntary retirement plans. The combined effect is poorly understood — and subject to widespread myths, including that the current “upside-down” system primarily benefits the wealthy.

Please join AEI as economist Peter Brady presents new research challenging this misconception. In his new book, “How America Supports Retirement: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom on Who Benefits,” he demonstrates that the full system is indeed progressive and warns that tax proposals to limit or fundamentally change tax deferral would make the code less fair. An expert panel will then discuss the myths and facts surrounding America’s retirement system, the power of today’s policies, and the risks of misinformed proposals.

Agenda

12:00 PM
Registration and lunch

12:30 PM
Introductory remarks:
Andrew G. Biggs, AEI

12:35 PM
Remarks:
Pete Brady, Investment Company Institute

1:00 PM
Panel discussion

Participants:
Bill Gale, Brookings Institution
Alan D. Viard, AEI

Moderator:
Andrew G. Biggs, AEI

1:40 PM
Q&A

2:00 PM
Adjournment

Read more!

Wednesday, January 6, 2016

CBO releases policy options paper for Social Security

In conjunction with its recently updated projections for Social Security’s finances, the Congressional Budget Office has released a menu of reform options for social security.

Given how large a deficit the CBO projects for Social Security – 4.4% of payroll over 75 years, nearly twice as large as the shortfall porjected by the Social Security Trustees – the task of putting together a package of reforms that would balance Social Security’s finances has gotten tougher.

Click here to check it out.

Read more!

Tuesday, January 5, 2016

Viard: “The Problem with Eliminating the Payroll Tax”

My AEI colleage Alan Viard writes about tax rforms that would eliminate the Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes:

Nobody loves the payroll tax. But, there’s a reason it’s been used to finance Social Security. If we’re going to change how Social Security is financed, we should do it as part of comprehensive entitlement reform.

Until then, let’s stop using the payroll tax as a political football.

Read on to find out why.

Twenty20 License

Read more!

WSJ: “New Evidence on the Phony ‘Retirement Crisis’”

In today’s Wall Street Journal, I provide an update on the debate over how to measure the adequacy of Social Security retirement benefits. The recent Technial Panel on Assumptions and Methods recommended a revised method for calculation “replacement rates.” The Congressional Budget Office, right before Christmas, followed up on those recommendations to produce replacement rate numbers using the CBO’s Long Term model. The results aren’t supportive of the idea that Social Security benefits are stingy.

The results are striking: The CBO projects that a typical middle-income individual born in the 1960s and retiring in the 2020s will be eligible for a Social Security benefit equal to 56% of his late-in-life earnings. For individuals in the bottom fifth of lifetime earnings, Social Security replaces about 95% of their substantial late-in-life earnings.

Even so, the CBO excluded the spousal or widow’s benefits that more than one-third of female retirees receive on top of the benefit based on their own earnings. Among retired women who receive these auxiliary benefits, the average total monthly benefit was $1,128, versus $634 based only on their own earnings. In short, the true replacement rates for many retired women are significantly higher than CBO figures show.

Add in 401(k) and other plans, and it should not be difficult for a typical worker to achieve a total replacement rate of 70% or even 80% through individual savings and Social Security benefits.

Check out the whole article here.

Read more!