"The Social Security Windfall Elimination and Government Pension Offset Provisions for Public Employees in the Health and Retirement Study"
Social Security Bulletin. 74(3): 55-69.
ALAN L. GUSTMAN, Dartmouth College - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
THOMAS L. STEINMEIER, Texas Tech University - Department of Economics and Geography
NAHID TABATABAI, Dartmouth College - Department of Economics
This article examines the Social Security Windfall Elimination Provision and Government Pension Offset. These provisions reduce the Social Security benefits of workers (and the resulting benefits of their spouses) if the prime beneficiary worked in “noncovered” employment (in which Social Security payroll taxes were not paid) that provided a pension, or if the spouse or survivor earned a pension from noncovered work. Using Health and Retirement Study data uniquely suited to the analysis, the authors calculate the household-level average lifetime benefit reductions resulting from these provisions and examine them in the context of lifetime Social Security income, pension income, and total wealth. The analysis also isolates the effects of pensions from noncovered employment on benefit adjustments and wealth.
"Health Effects of Containing Moral Hazard: Evidence from Disability Insurance Reform"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 14-102/V
PILAR GARCIA-GOMEZ, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)
ANNE C. GIELEN, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)
We exploit an age discontinuity in a Dutch disability insurance (DI) reform to identify the health impact of stricter eligibility criteria and reduced generosity. Women subject to the more stringent rule experience greater rates of hospitalization and mortality. A €1,000 reduction in annual benefits leads to a rise of 4.2 percentage points in the probability of being hospitalized and a 2.6 percentage point higher probability of death more than 10 years after the reform. There are no effects on the hospitalization of men subject to stricter rules but their mortality rate is reduced by 1.2 percentage points. The negative health effect on females is restricted to women with low pre-disability earnings. We hypothesize that the gender difference in the effect is due to the reform tightening eligibility particularly with respect to mental health conditions, which are mor e prevalent among female DI claimants. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that every dollar reduction in DI is almost completely offset by additional health care costs. This implies that policy makers considering a DI reform should carefully balance the welfare gains from reduced moral hazard against losses not only from less coverage of income risks but also from deteriorated health.
This paper exploits Social Security legislation changes to identify the causal effect of Social Security income on out-of-pocket medical expenditures of the elderly. Using the household level consumption data from the 1986-1994 Consumer Expenditure Survey and an instrumental variables strategy, the empirical results show that the estimated income elasticities of out-of-pocket total medical costs, medical service expenses, and prescription drug expenses are about 0.89, 1.05, and 0.86, respectively. The estimated elasticities increase substantially and are statistically significant for elderly individuals with less than a high school education. The corresponding income elasticities are 2.49, 3.66, and 1.38, respectively. The findings are in sharp contrast to existing studies that use micro-level data and provide evidence that health care is a luxury good among the low education elderly.
Unlike workers in many developed nations, far too few American workers today can look forward to financial independence as they age. As a result, many will be compelled to work much later into their lives, some into their 70s.
Social Security provides only a floor of retirement income. For many years defined benefit (DB) plans provided the core of retirement security, but today most DB plans in the private sector are closed to new employees, and those in the public sector are dramatically underfunded. A patchwork of defined contribution (DC) retirement plans – such as 401(k) 403 (b), and IRA – now serve as the primary retirement saving vehicles in the private sector, but they are complex, costly, and challenging for employers and employees to manage.
This paper recommends a single private DC pension system that can cover all working Americans, with a single set of rules.
A key part is the creation of broadly diversified Trusteed Retirement Funds (TRFs), whose sponsors are trustees, with fiduciary responsibilities.
Payroll deduction of every employee’s salary will automatically go into a broadly diversified TRF unless the employee either opts out or selects a preferred TRF (and unless the employer already sponsors a defined benefit pension plan).
TRF’s will relieve employers from fiduciary responsibility for all future DC contributions.
To protect retirees from the risks of inflation, longevity, and the unpredictability of the stock and bond markets, retirees will be encouraged to use their TRF savings to buy either an immediate or deferred indexed annuity. A Federal Longevity Insurance Administration will enable private insurance companies to provide cost-effective annuities.
All TRFs and annuities will be without marketing costs.
Tax deductions will be designed to stay within our nation’s current tax expenditures for retirement.
This paper offers a basis for near-term action by Congress and the Administration to help resolve the growing problem of funding workers’ retirement.